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  The matching of individuals in teams is a key element in the functioning of 
an economy. The network of social ties can potentially transmit important 
information on abilities and reputations and also help mitigate matching frictions by 
facilitating interactions among “screened” individuals. We conjecture that the 
probability of i and j forming a team is falling in the distance between i and j in the 
network of existing social ties. The objective of this paper is to empirically test this 
conjecture.  
  We examine the formation of coauthor relations among economists over a 
twenty year period. Our principal finding is that a new collaboration emerges faster 
among two researchers if they are “closer" in the existing coauthor network among 
economists. This proximity effect on collaboration is strong: being at a network 
distance of 2 instead of 3, for instance, raises the probability of initiating a 
collaboration by 27 percent.  
  Research collaboration takes place in an environment where fairly detailed 
information concerning individual ability and productivity -reflected in publications, 
employment history, etc.- is publicly available. Our finding that social networks are 
powerful even in this setting suggests that they must affect matching processes more 
generally. 
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 31 Introduction
The matching of individuals into teams to produce intellectual and physical output is a key
element in the functioning of an economy { e.g., job market, business partnerships, agency
contracts. The formation of a team has to address various types of information problems: there
are many potential team members to choose from, but the ability of individuals is privately
known (Akerlof, 1970; Diamond, 1982). In economics the formation of teams has traditionally
been studied within a search and matching framework.
In this framework, teammates are anonymous agents and search takes place via random
draws from the pool of potential partners; see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for a survey
of this work. It is reasonable to suppose that, to economize on friction costs, individuals will
use information easily available in their circle of friends and acquaintances.1
Local network embeddedness of the matching process is not an innocuous artefact of social
life; it has signi¯cant implications on distribution of matchings and welfare. Montgomery (1991)
studies the role of social networks in overcoming adverse selection problems in labor markets.
He ¯nds that a reliance on social network based referrals has powerful e®ects on wage inequality.
More recently, Jackson & Rogers (2007) propose a dynamic model of network formation in which
agents search for partners randomly as well as locally through the network. It is shown that local
network search exacerbates the inequality in the distribution of links and, if utility is concave
in number of links, this leads to lower social welfare.2 These theoretical ¯ndings motivate the
search for direct empirical evidence for the use of social networks.
This paper studies the formation of new collaborations in academic research. Research
collaboration is an environment where much public information is available on individual ability
{ e.g., publications record, employment history, etc. Consequently we would expect matching
frictions to be less prevalent than in other team formation processes. If network proximity
a®ects the formation of new teams even in such a favorable environment, we expect that social
networks will also matter for matching processes more generally.
We examine data on coauthorship among economists over a 30 year period, from 1970 to
1999. We show that two economists are more likely to publish together if they are close in the
network of all economics coauthors. This result is robust and statistically signi¯cant. Network
distance coe±cients are large in magnitude: being at a network distance of 2 instead of 3,
raises the probability of initiating a collaboration by 27 percent. Similarly, the probability of
two persons writing their ¯rst paper together increases by 18 percent if they are at a network
1These ideas have been extensively explored in the literature on social networks in sociology as well as eco-
nomics; see the seminal work of Granovetter (1995). For an overview of this work, see Goyal (2007).
2Moreover, subsequent work of Vigier (2009) shows that this inequality exacerbating feature is speci¯c of local
network search. For example, if local network search plays a minor role, and if the matching process is mostly
locally constrained by geographical distance, then the distribution of matchings turns out to be egalitarian.
4distance of 5 instead of 6. From this we conclude that social proximity among researchers
facilitates the creation of new scienti¯c collaborations. We develop a number of arguments {
based on a variety of controls of time invariant as well as time varying factors { to show that
this proximity e®ect can be interpreted as re°ecting °ows of information about individuals as
well as about the quality of the match.3
Research collaboration arises when individuals feel that it is bene¯cial to work together. So
common research interests, the educational background, and other individual characteristics will
clearly play a role in determining whether a collaboration arises. Indeed, in sections 3 and 4
below we discuss such evidence in some detail.4 Our results show that, over and above these
standard factors, the emergence of a new collaboration tie is decisively shaped by the existing
network of collaboration ties.
We do not have experimental data, so we must be very careful in making inferences on
network e®ects. An important aspect of our paper is the care with which we address the problems
which arise in making such inferences. In particular, factors such as a common background,
research interests and skill complementarity are likely to be correlated with proximity in the
social network of coauthorship. To identify social network e®ects, we need to convincingly
control for these confounding factors. This is an estimation problem common to all empirical
studies of peer e®ects. We deal with this di±culty in three ways.
First, we control for pairwise ¯xed e®ects. This takes care of all time-invariant complemen-
tarity and social proximity e®ects, such as similarity in age, place of education, stable research
interest etc. With pairwise ¯xed e®ects, identi¯cation of network e®ects is achieved solely from
the timing of collaboration, i.e., we ask whether, conditional on eventually publishing together,
a pair of authors is more likely to initiate a collaboration after they got closer in the network of
coauthorship.
Secondly, using the available data we construct control variables for time-varying e®ects,
such as changes in productivity and research interests. This takes care of the most serious
time-varying confounding factors.
Third, we remain concerned that results may be biased by unobserved time-varying e®ects
{ such as non-measurable changes in research interests { that a®ect the likelihood of collabora-
tion and are correlated with network proximity. Since these e®ects capture unobserved forces
that induce researchers to work together, they should a®ect the likelihood of all collaborations,
3Links to other researchers may also provide access to precious information about research and collaboration
opportunities. Consequently, poorly connected researchers may be at disadvantage. This observation provides a
link between our study of scienti¯c networks, and the growth and trade literatures which studies technology and
information transfer across economies. See, for example, the recent work by Hidalgo et al (2007). Similar ideas
have been discussed in the context of job markets by Topa (2001) and in the context of international trade by
Casella and Rauch (2002).
4For earlier work on the determinants of scienti¯c collaboration see McDowell and Melvin (1983) and Hudson
(1996).
5not just the ¯rst one. In contrast, network e®ects should only a®ect the likelihood of the ¯rst
collaboration between two authors: social networks carry relevant information and create op-
portunities for face-to-face interaction that may induce two authors to begin work together; but
once two authors have published together, they have a lot of information about match quality
and network proximity should no longer matter. Building on this observation, we conduct a
placebo-like experiment by contrasting the e®ect of network proximity on ¯rst and subsequent
collaborations. Time-varying confounding factors that are correlated with network proximity
should have a similar e®ect on ¯rst and subsequent scienti¯c collaborations; network e®ects
should only a®ect the ¯rst collaboration. We ¯nd that network proximity is only signi¯cantly
positive for the ¯rst collaboration.
This paper contributes to the empirical study of social networks. Informal institutions have
been empirically studied extensively in economics and other subjects; see e.g., Granovetter
(1985), Greif (2001), Munshi (2003), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), North (2001), Fafchamps
and Lund (2003) and Fafchamps (2004). The empirical study of the architecture of large and
evolving social networks is relatively new. In recent work, Krishnan and Sciubba (2009), Comola
(2008), Mayer and Puller (2008) study the formation of links. They argue that individual level
heterogeneity { re°ected in di®erences in wealth and race { plays an important role in the
creation of new links. By contrast, we control for individual di®erences and identify a pure
network proximity e®ect in the creation of new links. Our use of longitudinal date allows us to
make this stronger inference on network e®ects.5
This paper is also related to the literature on the economics on social interactions { see Man-
ski (2000), Mo±tt (2001) and Brock and Durlauf (2001), for overviews. This body of work argues
that a signi¯cant part of the variation in behavior across individuals faced with similar incentives
is due to their being a member of one group rather than another { e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996), Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan (2000), Banerjee and Munshi (2004),
and Du°o and Saez (2003). The focus of this literature is on explaining behavioral di®erences
across well de¯ned groups, paying special attention to the di±culty of empirically identifying
social interaction e®ects within groups. As in this literature, we take particular care to tackle
di±cult endogeneity problems, in particular the problem that the network e®ect may be spu-
rious as relevant unobserved individual characteristics, such as uncontrolled research interests,
are correlated in the local neighborhood. Our point of departure is that we look at di®erences
in social connections within a group to understand di®erences in individual behavior.6
5The e®ects of social networks are actively being studied. Conley and Udry (2008) who investigate the e®ects
of social communication networks on the individual decision to adopt new crops such as pineapple and Calv¶ o-
Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou (2008) study the e®ects of location in a network on human capital formation
and criminal activity.
6Bramoull¶ e, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) show that, in contrast to the use of group a±liation data, the use of
detailed network data allows stronger identi¯cation of endogenous and contextual network e®ects.
6This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a conceptual framework and
introduce the details of the testing strategy. The data are discussed in Section 3 and the
econometric results appear in Section 4.
2 Testing strategy
In this Section we begin by presenting a simple referral model, the sole purpose of which is
to motivate our estimating equation as an approximation to an arbitrary information sharing
network process. With this equation in hand, we present our testing strategy and discuss a
number of econometric issues that arise in the estimation of the model.
2.1 The estimating equation
Let St be the set of active researchers at time t. For the purpose of this paper, a researcher
is considered active from the moment of his or her ¯rst publication. Some pairs of researchers
have coauthored with each other, some have not. The pattern of coauthorship forms a network
in which each author is a node and each mutual acquaintance is a link between two nodes. The
set of all i 2 St and coauthor ties l
ij
t forms the network Gt. Because authors enter and exit and
links are added as a result of joint publication, the network changes over time.
Consider two authors i and j. We assume that, conditional on knowing each other, re-
searchers collaborate with probability m
ij
t · 1. Many factors are likely to a®ect i and j's
willingness m
ij
t to form a collaborative team { e.g., complementary skills, shared research in-
terest, proximity in age and background, etc. Some of this information { e.g., publication and
citation record { is publicly available, albeit at a ¯nancial or time cost; some relevant information
is not { e.g., whether the potential collaborator is reliable, easy to work with, etc.
Suppose that authors i and j share a common coauthor k. It is reasonable to suppose that i
and j can get information about each other via k, for instance because k talks to i about j and
vice versa. It is also possible that i and j met and became acquainted at a professional event
{ e.g., a conference { organized by k. Since the data does not enable us to distinguish between
these di®erent processes, we regard them as equivalent for the purpose of the model.
Let b < 1 denote the probability that author k \refers" i and j to each other, that is,
facilitates in one way or another the circulation of information that makes it easier for i and j to
assess the potential bene¯t from a collaboration. To facilitate exposition, assume for a moment
that m
ij
t = 1, that is, conditional on meeting each other, i and j wish to collaborate. In this
case, the probability P
ij
t of observing a collaboration between i and j at time t is given by:
P
ij
t = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ b)c (1)
7where c is the number of common coauthors between i and j { and thus the number of paths
between them: the more common coauthors i and j have, the more likely it is that they get to
know each other.
Now let us consider longer paths. The information that j gets about i from k may be passed
on to others whom j knows. Alternatively, when i organizes an event afterwards, she may invite
some of her past collaborators along with j and k, facilitating contact among collaborators of i;j
and k. The quality of information that is being conveyed in this fashion will decay as it passes
{ indirectly { through more members of the group. The match facilitating e®ect of network
proximity is thus likely to fall with network distance. These considerations lead us to conjecture
that the probability of i and j engaging in a collaboration is falling in the distance between i
and j in the network of social ties.
To formalize this idea is a simple way, suppose that the probability that a node j trans-
mits information along a given path is independent from the probability that the same node
j transmits the same information along another path. With this assumption, the probability
of receiving the information over distance k when there are ck paths of length k linking i to j
becomes:
Pij = 1 ¡
1 Y
k=2
(1 ¡ bk¡1)ck (2)
where we have dropped time subscripts on Pij and ck to improve readability. Let dij denote
the length of the shortest path between i and j and let cij denote the number of shortest paths
between i and j. Rewriting (2) in terms of 1 ¡ Pij and taking logs on both sides, we get:
log(1 ¡ Pij) =
1 X
k=2






The ¯rst approximation relies on log(1 + a) ¼ a for a small, while the second approximation
relies on b being small. For the last approximation to be reasonable, it must be that ck does not
increase rapidly with distance.
We now use approximation (4) to derive an estimable model of collaboration. Let us assume
that P
ij








8The dependent variable takes value 1 if i and j collaborate, and 0 otherwise. Approximation
(4) suggests a reasonable way of writing X0
t¯. Dropping time subscripts to improve readability,
we have:





= 1 + eX0¯
cijbdij¡1 = log(1 + eX0¯)
¼ eX0¯ (5)
where we use log(1 + a) ¼ a for a small. Approximation (5) is admittedly crude, but since its
sole purpose is to motivate the estimation regression, this is not too serious a concern.
We now reintroduce the probability m
ij
t < 1 of collaborating, conditional on knowing each
other. The unconditional probability of collaborating is equal to the probability of being "re-
ferred" to each other times the conditional probability of collaborating m
ij








t ¼ mijeX0¯ = eX0
t¯+Z0
t°
Combining the above with (5), our estimated model takes the form:
X0
t¯ + Z0






We thus need to estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is whether i and j
collaborate at time t, and the regressors are the length of the shortest path d
ij
t¡1, the number of
shortest paths c
ij





lagged to avoid simultaneity bias. The coe±cient of d
ij
t¡1 measures the log of unknown probability
b (a negative number since b < 1) and the coe±cient of logc
ij
t¡1 should be approximately 1.
2.2 The acquaintance network
So far, we have assumed that information about author ability and personal attributes travels
via coauthor ties only. In practice, information about coauthor ability and other attributes is
likely to circulate more broadly among the acquaintances of i and j. To investigate how this may
a®ect inference, let us de¯ne the (unobserved) network of personal acquaintance such that a link
exists between i and j exists in this network if i and j know each other well enough to transmit
accurate and trustworthy information about other researchers' type. The acquaintance network
is denser { i.e., has more links { than the coauthor network but, and this is the important point,
9the acquaintance network includes the coauthor network since people who have coauthored a
paper together know each other.7
We have seen that the probability that two researchers are referred to each other is a de-




c denote the shortest





c similarly. Dropping time and individual subscripts to improve readability, we now have
P ¼ mcabda¡1 and hence the data generation process approximately follows:
X0¯ + Z0° = ¡logb + logca + logb(da) + logm
The problem is that we observe dc but we do not observe da. However, dc provides some
useful information regarding da. Since the coauthorship network is a subset of the acquaintance
network, we must have: da · dc. It follows that E[dajdc] increases with dc. In other words,
dc provides information about unknown da since the average value of unobserved da increases
monotonically with observed dc.
This is illustrated with a simple computer experiment, in which we simulate an `acquaintance
network' and corresponding `co-author network' by following the procedure of Jackson & Rogers
(2007) for a 1000 nodes.8 Figure (1a) shows a histogram of the simulated acquaintance network,
obtained by following the Jackson-Rogers procedure with m = 8:4, r = 4:7 and p = 1. Note
that almost all acquaintances tend to be within only 3 degrees of separation. Next, we randomly
select 10 percent of the links from the `acquaintance network' to obtain a corresponding `coauthor
network'.9 As the coauthor network is a subgraph of the acquaintance network, the distance
in the acquaintance network between two nodes is bounded from above by the distance in the
coauthor network. We then analyze the relation between da and dc in these simulated networks.
Figure (1b) shows the results.
As predicted, we observe that E[dajdc] increases monotonically with dc. Given that there is
a monotonic relation between dc and da, we can therefore regard dc as a valid proxy variable for
da (Wooldridge, 2002). To summarize, if we regress Pij on d
ij
c and ¯nd a signi¯cant relationship,
7This is a reasonable assumption in economics, where most coauthored papers have 2 or three authors. This
may not be a reasonable assumption in other sciences where the number of authors on a single paper can be large.
8The procedure of Jackson & Rogers (2007) generates networks that mimic the stylized facts of real social
networks, namely: a fat-tail degree distribution, short network distances, high clustering, a positive assortativity
and a negative relation between degree and clustering.
9The model of Jackson & Rogers (2007) only requires the estimation of three parameters: the average in-
degree, m, the ratio of random vs. local links, r, and the probability that a searched node is linked to, p. In
the case of the co-author network of economists Jackson & Rogers (2007) ¯nd that for the 1990s, the best ¯t is
obtained with parameters m = :84, r = 4:7 and p = :10 (Jackson & Rogers, 2007:p. 902, Table 1).
If we consider acquaintances as nodes that are searched, and co-authors as the searched nodes that with
probability p = :10 receive a link, then we may simulate the `acquaintance network' by simulating the Jackson
& Rogers model with parameters m = 8:4, r = 4:7 and p = 1, and the corresponding `co-author network' by
randomly taking 10 percent of the links of the simulated `acquaintance network'.
10this means that network proximity matters. If we do not ¯nd a signi¯cant relationship, it could
be either because there is none or because our proxy variable is too crude.
It is important to note that the information content of dc increases as dc falls. This is because
as dc falls, the conditional distribution of da gets `squeezed' around its lower bound (at the lower
bound of dc = 1 we know that da = 1 as well). In contrast, when dc is large, e.g., well above the
distribution of da, it conveys little if any information about the likely value of da. The di®erence
between da and dc thus falls with dc. Put di®erently, dc becomes a better measure of da at low
values of dc. This idea can be investigated by regressing Pij on a series of dummy variables,
one for each value of dc. We expect dummy coe±cients to be strongest and most signi¯cant at
low values of dc while coe±cients should be negligible and non-signi¯cant for values of dc above
a certain threshold.
Turning to the number of paths, cc also constitutes an imperfect measure of ca. To see this,
note that if dc = da then ca ¸ cc: if the coauthorship distance is the same as acquaintance
distance, then the number of paths between i and j in the coauthorship network provides a
lower bound for the number of paths in the acquaintance network. We have already argued that
the likelihood that dc = da increases at low values of dc. Combining the two observations, it
follows that cc constitutes a proxy variable for ca and that the accuracy of this proxy variable
is higher at low values of dc. This is also con¯rmed in our simulation. Figure (1c) shows the
coe±cient of a standard linear regression of ca on cc for di®erent levels of coauthor distance dc.
Clearly, the relation between ca and cc is accurate for low dc as the coe±cient is close to 1, but
the relation becomes weaker when dc increases.
If, however, referrals only circulate via the coauthorship network, then equation (6) is the
correct model and there is no attenuation bias as dc increases. This suggests a way of testing
whether referrals only circulate in the coauthorship network: add an interaction term of the
form dc £ logcc to equation (6). If the coauthorship network is embedded inside a denser
acquaintance network, attenuation bias implies that the coe±cient of the interaction term is
negative: logcc becomes a worse proxy for logca as dc increases. If referral circulates only in
the coauthorship network, then the interaction term should be non-signi¯cant.10
2.3 Econometric issues





t are signi¯cant with the correct sign. For estimation to yield meaningful inference about







t . Our biggest concern is unobserved heterogeneity. Collaboration depends on
10While dc and cc can serve as proxies for E[da] and E[ca], the same cannot be said of the number of links ck
at longer network distances. This is another reason why our estimation is based on equation (4) even though, in
principle, we could have used the more general (3).
11many factors that are not observed by us. For example, researchers choose to work together
because they share common interests or complementary abilities. These determinants of match
quality m
ij
t are likely to be positively correlated with network distance and may lead to spurious
`network e®ects', unless they are appropriately controlled for.
We do so by decomposing match quality determinants Z0° into two parts: a pairwise ¯xed
e®ect ¹ij and time-varying controls for match quality Z
ij
t . The pairwise ¯xed e®ect controls
for all time-invariant characteristics of both authors i and j, including their time and place of
birth, gender, ethnicity, mother tongue, where they received their education, and where they
started their career. Pairwise ¯xed e®ects also control for any time-invariant determinants of
match quality, such as mutual empathy, complementarity of skills, and commonality of interest
and outlook.
Pairwise ¯xed e®ects do not, however, control for time variation in individual characteristics
and match quality. To this e®ect, we introduce time-varying controls for productivity and overlap
in research interests. How we construct these variables is discussed in details below.
Because experimental data is unavailable, there remains the possibility that time-varying





t . To deal with this issue, we note that, after i and j have collaborated once, they know
each other and their likelihood of collaborating only depends on match quality m
ij
t . It follows
that the probability of observing i and j collaborating, conditional on them having collaborated




t . This suggests a placebo-like




t are signi¯cant in equation (6) only because they
are correlated with an unobserved dimension of match quality m
ij





t would have the same e®ect on ¯rst and subsequent collaborations. On the other
hand, if we observe an e®ect in the regression on ¯rst collaboration, but not such an e®ect
in the regression on subsequent collaboration, then this is strong evidence that our results are
not driven by correlated e®ects due to unobserved or uncontrolled dimensions of the matching
quality m
ij
t , but are in fact due to pure network e®ects that alleviate informational frictions.
To clarify how an unobserved dimension of m
ij
t creates an spurious network e®ect on ¯rst and
subsequent collaboration, we ¯rst point out that we measure the network distance d
ij
t between
two economists i and j exluding the link between i and j itself. Hence, the distance between i
and j is always at least 2, and also after the ¯rst collaboration the network distance between
i and j will be °uctuating over time. This allows the network distance to be correlated to
unobserved dimensions of match quality m
ij
t even after the ¯rst collaboration. For example,
suppose that common research interests is the sole driving force behind collaboration, and that
research interests of i and j converge further after the ¯rst collaboration. In that case, i becomes
more likely to collaborate to one of the co-authors of j, as j's co-authors are likely to have the
12same research interests of j and therefore get closer in research interests to i. It is therefore likely
that the network distance between i and j (excluding the link i and j itself) becomes shorter
even after the ¯rst collaboration. If i and j are more likely to strengthen their collaboration due




t be a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if authors i and j publish a article
together in year t, and 0 otherwise. For the ¯rst collaboration between a pair of authors i and
j, we test whether, conditional y
ij
t¡s = 0 for all s, the likelihood that y
ij

















@f=@d < 0 and @f=@c > 0. If the coe±cients have the correct signs, this indicates that there













where network distance d
ij
t¡1 is de¯ned ignoring direct coauthorship links between i and j, i.e.,
d
ij
t¡1 is the length of the shortest path between i and j in the coauthorship network that does
not include their direct coauthorship link. We expect that @g=@d = 0 and @g=@c = 0 since the
authors now know the match quality. Estimating equations (7) and (8) is the objective of the
paper.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in (7) and (8) we include a pairwise ¯xed e®ect ¹ij























Equations (9) and (10) are estimated separately using a ¯xed e®ect logit model. Fixed e®ects
¹ij in (10) are allowed to di®er from that in (9).11
The inclusion of ¯xed e®ects in equation (9) raises an estimation problem. To understand
the nature of the problem, consider two authors who began their publishing career at time t0
and coauthor their ¯rst paper together at time t1. By construction, y
ij
t = 0 for all t 2 [t0;t1)
and y
ij
t = 1 for t = t1. For each pair ij the time sequence of dependent variables thus takes the
11Since equation (10) is estimated using only author pairs that have collaborated at least once, it is potentially
subject to selection bias. This is not a cause for concern in this case given that the ¯xed e®ect in (10) absorbs
any Mills ratio/selection correction term.
13form yij = f0;:::;0;1g, in which the number of 0's varies across author pairs. Equation (9) is
equivalent to a single-spell, discrete time duration model with ¯xed e®ects.
The estimation of duration models with ¯xed e®ects raises a well known identi¯cation prob-
lem because duration dependence and ¯xed e®ects cannot be separately estimated. This lack
of identi¯cation does not a®ect us directly, however, because we are not interested in the shape
of the hazard function over time, i.e., equations (9) and (10) do not include time as regressor.
Our sole focus is the variation of the hazard with time-varying regressors. Given this, it remains
possible to identify and consistently estimate coe±cients of time-varying regressors, as has been
shown for instance by Allison & Christakis (2006). This is unproblematic for regressors that do
not trend over time. But regressors that contain a trend mechanically generate a spurious cor-
relation with the dependent variable. This is because, by construction, the dependent variable
y
ij
t takes the form of a series of 0 followed by a single 1; hence any regressor that exhibits a
positive or negative trend will automatically help predict y
ij
t . We elaborate on the nature of the
problem using a Monte Carlo simulation in Appendix A; see also Allison & Christakis (2006).
Almost all our regressors display trending behavior. In particular, network distance between i
and j becomes smaller over time as both i and j become better connected.
The solution we adopt for this problem is to eliminate any time trend in the regressors by
de-trending each of them individually. We accomplish this by ¯rst regressing each regressor on a
pairwise-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect and a linear time trend. Residuals from this regression are then used
in (9) in lieu of the original regressors.12 In Appendix A we show that this method performs well
for our purpose. Detrending regressors naturally results in a loss of information and therefore
leads to an attenuation bias similar to that which occurs as a result of introducing ¯xed e®ects in
a linear regression. As a result, our estimates err on the conservative side. If we ¯nd signi¯cant
results under these conservative circumstances, we thus can be con¯dent that they are really
signi¯cant. The method is nevertheless sensitive to correct speci¯cation of the trend. To protect
against the possibility of misspeci¯cation in detrending, we check the robustness of our results
with respect to various detrending methods. This is discussed in detail in subsection 5.4.
Pairwise ¯xed e®ects capture many individual or pairwise factors that a®ect the likelihood
of forming a scienti¯c collaboration, such as having gone to the same graduate school, having
similar abilities, or sharing common interests. However, productivity, research interests, and
propensity to collaborate are likely to change over a researcher's career, and these changes
may be correlated with changes in network distance. Using the available data, we construct a
number of control variables to address these concerns. These include proxies for research ability,
12We also apply this procedure to model (10) even though in this case correction is not required since the
dependent variable does not exhibit any systematic time trend. As we will see in this case detrending does not
a®ect results much.
14propensity to collaborate, and research overlap. How these variables are constructed is detailed
in the data section, to which we now turn.
3 A description of the data
The data used for this paper come from the EconLit database, a bibliography of journals in
economics compiled by the editors of the Journal of Economic Literature. From this database
we use information on all articles published between 1970 and 1999. We ¯rst de¯ne all the
variables we will use in our study and also describe how we measure them in the context of our
data set. Then we present descriptive statistics from our data set.13
3.1 De¯nition of variables
We ¯rst turn to the de¯nition of the dependent variable y
ij
t . For the purpose of the econometric
analysis, we consider a researcher active from the year of ¯rst publication. The set of active
authors at time t is denoted St. Each researcher i 2 St can potentially coauthor an article with
any other researcher j 2 St. More precisely, suppose authors i and j coauthor their ¯rst paper
together in year t
ij
1 . We create a variable y
ij
t that takes value 1 at t = t
ij
1 and 0 at t < t
ij
1 . To
determine whether i and j are active at time t 6= t
ij
1 , we look in the database for the earliest
year of publication for each author separately, say ti
0 and t
j






We thus have y
ij
t = 0 for all t
ij




t = 1 for t = t
ij
1 .
We proceed similarly for subsequent joint publications. To ¯nd the last year that both
i and j are active, we look in the database for the latest year that i and j separately have
a publication, say ti
2 and t
j





2g. The dependent variable for
subsequent collaboration is then de¯ned for all t
ij




t = 1 if i and j coauthored a
publication in year t and y
ij
t = 0 otherwise.
We next consider the de¯nition of the explanatory variables. We construct network distance
d
ij
t as follows. We start by constructing the coauthorship network Gt using authors as nodes
and coauthorship as network links and including all publications from year t ¡ 9 until t. The
reason for combining 10 years of publications is that the relation that is formed by coauthoring a
paper does not die o® instantaneously. As a consequence, we lose the ¯rst 10 years of the sample
as starting values. Our analysis therefore only considers articles published between 1980 and
1999.14 Having obtained the coauthorship network, we compute the shortest network distance
13We realize that publication in economics takes place with signi¯cant lags. It is indeed not uncommon for a
paper to be published in a journal several years after it was ¯rst brought out as a working paper. Since all our data
comes from published articles, however, on average the same publication lags a®ect all variables. Nonetheless,
publication lags typically vary per article, and this may contaminate our results. To test for robustness we
therefore repeat our analysis lagging the explanatory variables by 3 years instead of 1 year, see Subsection 5.2.




t from i to j in Gt. For instance, if i and j have both published with k, then d
ij
t = 2. Variable
c
ij
t is the number of shortest paths between i and j in Gt; it is 0 if i and j are unconnected.
When computing the distance and the number of shortest paths from i to j, any direct link (i.e.,
coauthorship) between i and j is ignored.
If there is no chain of authors leading from i to j in the 10 years prior to t, then d
ij
t is not
de¯ned (it is de facto in¯nite). For this reason, we ¯nd it easier to work with the inverse of
distance, which we call network proximity p
ij











t varies between 0 and 1=2. It is 0:5 if i and j share a common coauthor and it





t never takes the value 1, even in the regression on subsequent collaborations, i.e. when i and
j already collaborated in the past. Variable p
ij
t is the distance measure used in the estimation
of equation (9) and (10).
Next we turn to time-varying controls Z
ij
t which proxy for changes in match quality and
therefore in the conditional collaboration probability m
ij
t . We start with research ability. Au-
thors who publish more on average have more coauthors and thus are better linked, and thus
closer to each other in the coauthorship network. To the extent that authors match on research
ability, omitting this variable may lead to incorrect inference. As proxy variable for research
ability, we measure individual productivity qi
t using the publication record of each author in
the Econlit database. Standard measures of publication quality combine quantity (number and
length of published articles) with quality (e.g., journal rank). We use a simple scheme which
captures these ideas and relies on recent citations ranking of journals, namely the quality weight-
ing system developed by the Tinbergen Institute, a research center based in Amsterdam and
Rotterdam.15 This list of journals (hereafter the TI list) is used by the Institute to assess the
research output of faculty members at 3 leading Dutch Universities (University of Amsterdam,
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Free University Amsterdam). Tenure decisions taken at the
Tinbergen Institute are taken based on the number of points a researcher has accumulated.
The Institute currently lists 133 journals in economics and related ¯elds (econometrics, ac-
counting, marketing, and operations research), of which 113 are covered by EconLit in 2000.
This list of journals, which is reproduced in Appendix B, is split into 3 categories: AA, A and
B. Based on this we de¯ne a journal quality index as follows: a journal in category AA yields
four points, a journal in category A yields 2 points, a journal in category B yields 1 point, and
15See http://www.tinbergen.nl/research/admission.html for a full description of the TI point system. The
rankings of journals mentioned in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) were used as an input in deriving
the TI list.
16a journal in an unlisted journal yields 0 points. For each published article, each author is given
a number of points according to the formula:
Points =
Journal quality index £ Number of pages
Number of authors + 1
Variable qi
t is the number of points author i has accumulated in the years from t ¡ 9 to t.
Research output qi
t is author-speci¯c. Since the estimating equations are dyadic and the
underlying network is undirected, Z
ij
t regressors must enter the regression in a symmetric way.


















High productivity authors may be more likely to collaborate since they are more attractive to
each other. If this is the case, we expect m
ij
t to increase in q
ij
t . The sign of ¢q
ij
t depends
on whether authors match on productivity, or whether coauthorship is more likely between




t are simply control
variables, so we do not discuss their possible interpretation further.
Our next control variables proxy for propensity to collaborate. To the extent that this trait is
time-invariant, it is captured in the ¯xed e®ect. But a researcher's propensity to collaborate may
also vary over time: as authors build up coauthoring links with a large number of other authors,
new collaboration opportunities probably arise at a higher rate. A researcher's network of past
collaborators may thus measure a time-varying propensity to collaborate. Because authors with
many collaborators have a higher degree in the coauthorship network, their distance to other
authors is on average smaller. This may generate a spurious correlation between changes in
network distance and coauthorship. To control for this e®ect, we calculate the total number of
coauthors an author had in the recent past. A researcher who recently had many collaborators
is likely to have a higher propensity to collaborate. More precisely, we compute the number of
coauthors ni
t of author i over the ten years preceding time t, and similarly for author j. Since
regressors must enter the regression in a symmetric fashion, we transform ni
t and n
j
t in the same
fashion as we did for qi
t and q
j
t, that is, we compute their mean n
ij
t and absolute di®erence ¢n
ij
t .
16It is possible to show that the relation of the propensity to collaborate to the ability of i and j depends on
the forms taken by returns to colaboration. If e®ort is irrelevant, then we expect researchers of similar ability to
work together. This is because high ability researchers only tend to collaborate if the partner is herself of high
ability. Otherwise a high ability research could as well work on her own. On the other hand, if e®ort matters as
well, dissimilar matching can arise whereby a researcher with high ability teams up with a less able researcher
who provides much of the e®ort. In that case it is possible that ability di®erentials may increase incentives to
collaborate.
17We also wish to control for research overlap between authors. A commonality of research
interest is probably the single most important factor in determining the likelihood of collabora-
tion. We therefore expect authors to be more likely to collaborate if they share similar research
interests. Pairwise ¯xed e®ects probably absorb much of the in°uence of commonality of inter-
ests on the likelihood of collaboration. There nevertheless remains the possibility that research
interests evolve over time and that this change brings researchers together. Since authors who
work on similar topics are more likely to collaborate, changes in network distance are likely to
be correlated with changes in research overlap.
To control for this possibility, we construct an index !
ij
t of research overlap between any two
researchers. We want this index to capture not just having worked in similar research areas but
also overlap in research topics. For instance, if a researcher has worked on, say, development
economics and microeconomic theory (2 separate categories in JEL codes), she may be more
likely to work with another researcher who has also focused on development and micro. To
capture this idea, we construct an index of overlapping interests !
ij
t .
To do this, we use the JEL classi¯cation codes contained in the EconLit database. We
categorize articles into 121 sub¯elds according to the ¯rst two digits of the JEL codes.17 Articles
with multiple JEL codes are `divided' and assigned proportionally to each of the corresponding
¯elds.18 We then consider the cosine similarity measure as a measure of ¯eld overlap between
i and j in year t. This measure is computed as follows. Suppose that xi
t;f is the fraction of
articles written by i in ¯eld f in the period from t ¡ 9 to t (such that
P
f xi
















The cosine similarity measure is a standard measure used by computer scientists in the develop-
ment of search engines; see Salton and McGill (1983). It ranges from 0 if i and j did not write
any paper in the same ¯eld, to 1 if i and j wrote in exactly the same ¯elds and in exactly the
same proportion.
Recent work on cognitive distance (Wuyts et al., 2005) suggests that research overlap a®ects
the probability to collaborate in two ways. On the one hand, collaboration is only attractive when
the researchers involved have complementary knowledge or skills. This suggest that collaboration
17The JEL classi¯cation is the most common ¯eld classi¯cation system used in Economics, and can be found
at http://www.econlit.org/subject descriptors.html. The JEL classi¯cation changed in 1991. For articles
before 1991 we matched old JEL codes to new JEL codes on the basis of the code descriptions. A correspondence
table between old and new JEL codes can be obtained from the authors on request. We also experimented with a
coarser classi¯cation of 9 main ¯elds based on the ¯rst digit of the JEL codes, but this did not have any qualitative
impact on the results.
18To give an example, if for one article the JEL codes A10, A11 and B31 are given, then 2/3 of the article is
assigned to ¯eld A1, while 1/3 of the article is assigned to ¯eld B3.
18is unlikely when there is too much overlap in skills and thus when research overlap is too strong.
On the other hand, one must have some common ground in order to collaborate. Hence, research
overlap cannot be too small. This suggests an inverted U-curve relation between collaboration
and research overlap. To allow for this possibility, we include a quadratic term (!
ij
t )2 in the
regression as well.19
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics of the various variables used in the analysis. Column
1 provides a sample of pairs that never collaborated, column 2 provides statistics on a sample
of collaborating pairs before their ¯rst collaboration, and column 3 provides data on a sample
of collaborating pairs after their ¯rst collaboration. These data are obtained as follows. In
the period from 1980 to 1999 in total 73,873 economists in the dataset collaborated at least
once. This allows for about 73873 £ 73872=2 ¼ 2.7 billion potential collaborating pairs, but we
observe that only 93,223 of those pairs have collaborated. Since it is computationally impossible
to analyze 2.7 billion non-collaborating pairs, we draw a random sample of 162,166 author
pairs, with a corresponding number of 921,392 pair-years.20 The provided statistics, reported
in column 1, serve as a benchmark. We observe that economists on average have 2 coauthors,
and that two economists are connected via a path with 20 % probability and that it they are
connected the average distance is 10. These ¯gures correspond to those given in Goyal, van der
Leij and Moraga (2006).
For the estimation of the ¯rst collaboration regression (9), we only consider pairs of authors
who have a jointly published paper within the 1980-1999 time frame.21 The ¯xed e®ect logit
model requires a dependent variable that, for each pair of authors, varies over time. Pairs of
authors who never collaborated have yij = f0;:::0g and thus drop out of the analysis.22 This
leaves us with 26,922 collaborating pairs. For each of them, we construct a sequence of y
ij
t from
the time they ¯rst publish independently until their ¯rst collaboration. This results in over
160,000 observations. The time elapsed from the ¯rst publication until ij publish their ¯rst
joint article is 6 years on average.
19We also considered the use of a±liation data. However, this turned out to be highly problematic. The JEL
database contains information about author a±liation, but only after 1989 and occasionally in 1988. Moreover
the data is spotty and incomplete. As a result, the inclusion of this a±liation data reduced the power of any test
on signi¯cance dramatically. On top of that, the a±liation mentioned on an article is typically the a±liation at
the time of publication, and very often this does not correspond to the a±liations at the time of the decision to
collaborate. We therefore decided not to include these results in the paper.
20In drawing the sample, we have rejected all pairs for which there is no time overlap between the authors, i.e.,
we ensure that for each randomly selected pair of potential coauthors there is some overlap in the years that the
two economists are actively publishing.
21Due to lack of data, we cannot take into account pairs of authors who attempted joint work but failed to
publish jointly.
22Pairs that directly collaborated in the ¯rst possible year also drop out since y
ij = f1g.
19Before the ¯rst collaboration, the probability that i and j are directly or indirectly connected
via the coauthorship network is 43%. If connected, the average network distance d
ij
t between
them is around 7. This is a much shorter distance in comparison to the network distance of
those pairs that never collaborated. Network distance is thus smaller for pairs that eventually
start a collaboration, suggesting that collaboration is associated with `closeness' in the network.
To illustrate this further, we plot in Figure 2 the histogram of network distances in the
entire author network and compare it with that of network distances for collaborating pairs.23
In a world of random matching, the probability distribution of distance among new matches
should roughly mirror the probability distribution of distances in the existing network among
the authors. However, as Figure 2(b) shows, coauthors are on average much closer to each other
than pairs of authors taken at random. Dividing one set of frequencies by the other yields a
non-parametric measure of the probability of an ij tie conditional on network distance. The
result of this calculation, displayed in the last panel of Figure 2, shows a clear monotonic decline
with distance. Network distance is thus associated with a fall in the likelihood of collaborating.
While this constitutes preliminary evidence of network e®ects, for this evidence to be convincing
we need to control for possible confounding factors. To this we now turn.
Control variables described in Section 3 are presented in Table 1. We observe that produc-
tivity qi
t and number of coauthors ni
t in the second column are higher than in the ¯rst column.
This mainly re°ects the fact that economists with more links are by de¯nition sampled more
often in the second dataset.24 Statistics on ¯eld overlap appear next in Table 1. The ¯eld
overlap index !
ij
t is around .30, much higher than the .05 among non-collaborators, indicating
that economists typically collaborate with someone in their ¯eld.
Similar statistics are reported in column 3 for subsequent collaborations. As for (9), estima-
tion of regression (10) with pairwise ¯xed e®ects requires variation in the dependent variable.
This implies that we only sample pairs who have at least one subsequent collaboration, that is,
pairs who have collaborated twice in at least two di®erent years. This leaves 14,558 coauthor
pairs. For each of these pairs we construct a sequence of y
ij
t from the year following ¯rst joint
publication until the year of last publication. This gives a little over 105,000 observations. We
see from Table 1 that once a collaboration has been successfully initiated, it tends to be repeated:
conditional on publishing more than once together, on average a pair of authors publishes jointly
in one year out of four. If we compare column 3 with column 2 we see that authors who continue
collaborating tend to be closer in the author network. Field overlap is higher as well.
23For the purpose of this Figure, we use the author network from 1980 to 1989 and de¯ne collaborating pairs
as those who start a collaboration in 1990.
24This fact raises concerns of sample selectivity and clustered correlations. To address these concerns we provide
a robustness check in Subsection 5.3, in which we ensure that only one collaboration per author is sampled.
204 Econometric results
4.1 The role of network proximity
We now present the econometric estimation of the models presented in Section 2. We begin
with equation (9) which analyzes the determinants of the ¯rst collaboration between a pair of
researchers. The basic regression model is of the form:
Pr(y
ij
t = 1) = ¸(¯p
ij
t¡1 + °1 logc
ij
t¡1 + ¹ij): (11)
where ¸(:) denotes the logit function.
We ¯rst estimate naive logit regressions on the probability to start and continue a collabo-
ration without controlling for ¯xed e®ects, that is, assuming that ¹ij = ¹. As explained before,
these results are likely to be biased upwards due to unobserved variables that are related to
both collaboration and social network distance. However, they serve as a useful benchmark for
our later estimations. The results are presented in Table 2.
The ¯rst two columns of Table 2 present the results of the logit regression on the probability
to initiate a collaboration. This data set contains collaborating pairs as well as pairs that never
collaborated.25 The results in the ¯rst two columns con¯rm the preliminary analysis in Figure 2.
In particular, we observe that proximity has a large coe±cient of 13.9. Using the approximation
of (5), this coe±cient implies that the probability to start a collaboration is approximately 10
times larger for pairs that are at distance 2 than for pairs that are at distance 3. Including control
variates such as productivity, ¯eld overlap and number of coauthors shows that, as expected,
standard economic factors have a strongly signi¯cant e®ect on the probability to collaborate.
In particular ¯eld overlap is strongly signi¯cant, more signi¯cant than the network proximity
variable. These control variables are all correlated with network proximity, and the inclusion
reduces the magnitude of the proximity e®ect somewhat, but note that the reduction of the
proximity e®ect is not very large.
We ¯nd a much bigger di®erence when we compare the results of the ¯rst two columns to the
results of the last two columns, which contain the results of continuing a collaboration. Although
the e®ect of proximity on subsequent collaboration remains signi¯cantly positive, the e®ect is
much smaller than in the case of ¯rst collaboration. Remember, though, that this estimate is
derived from a regression that does not control for pairwise ¯xed e®ects.
We now turn to the results of the main regression that does control for pairwise ¯xed e®ects.
Equation (11) is estimated using conditional logit to eliminate the ¯xed e®ect ¹ij. As detailed in
25As explained in Subsection 3.2, there are too many non-collaborating pairs to include them all in the dataset.
We therefore only include a random subsample of them, as described in Table 1. Together with the pairs that
do collaborate we have about 200,000 pairs and more than a million observations. Reported standard errors are
adjusted to correct for the undersampling of non-collaborating pairs.
21Appendix A, all regressors are detrended to eliminate spurious correlation with the dependent
variable. Results are reported in column (1) of Table 3. The results show a strong positive e®ect
of network proximity p
ij
t : the magnitude of the coe±cient is large and the z-statistic is highly
signi¯cant. When we include additional control variates (column 2), the proximity coe±cient
falls by 28%, but remains strongly signi¯cant. In fact, the signi¯cance is stronger than any of the
control variates. This suggests that network proximity plays an important role in the formation
of new research collaboration ties.
We wish to ascertain whether this result is driven by a local e®ect over short network dis-
tances, or whether it is a more di®use e®ect extending to long network distances. To investigate
this idea, we replace p
ij
t with network distance dummies and re-estimate model (11) with control
variables, without and with pairwise ¯xed e®ects. The coe±cient of distance d dummy measures
the e®ect on the probability of tie formation of i and j being at distance d
ij
t = d relative to i
and j being unconnected. Coe±cient estimates for distance dummies are presented in Figure 3
for the simple logit regression and in Figure 4 for the pairwise ¯xed e®ects regression. In both
¯gures the dashed lines depicts the 95% con¯dence interval.
Results indicate that network e®ects are not limited to short distances: distance dummies
remain signi¯cant up to 9 degrees of separation. The same pattern is observed irrespective
of whether or not we control for pairwise ¯xed e®ects. Estimated coe±cients are larger in
the standard logit regression but remain signi¯cant when we control for pairwise ¯xed e®ects.
Even with ¯xed e®ects, the quantitative impact of proximity on the probability of coauthorship
is large: being at a network distance of 2 instead of 3 raises the probability of initiating a
collaboration by approximately 27 percent. The e®ect remains noticeable at larger distances.
For example, being connected at a network distance of 5 instead of 6 implies that the probability
of forming a link is 18 percent higher.
We continue the analysis by turning to subsequent collaborations, conditional on having
collaborated once. If network proximity increases the likelihood of collaboration because of
some kind of \referral" or mutual introduction e®ect, we should expect network proximity not
to be signi¯cant for subsequent collaborations. This is because, once two researchers have worked
together, they no longer need to be introduced or given a referral about each other. This suggests
a kind of placebo experiment: if we regress repeat co-authorship on network proximity, we should
observe no e®ect. In contrast, if network proximity is correlated with time-varying unobserved
match quality, then it should remain signi¯cant for subsequent collaborations as well.
To investigate these ideas, we estimate equations (11) using data on subsequent collabo-
rations. Results are summarized in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. The key ¯nding is the
following: network proximity no longer has a positive e®ect on coauthorship. This ¯nding is
consistent with the network interpretation and provides reassurance that the positive network
22e®ect on ¯rst collaboration is unlikely to be the result of omitted variable bias. Indeed, this would
require that the omitted variable only a®ects the likelihood of ¯rst collaboration, something we
¯nd improbable.
In Table 3 network proximity has a signi¯cant but negative coe±cient. This is unexpected
and needs to be explained. To investigate why this is the case, we re-estimate model (11) with
distance dummies instead of p
ij
t . Results, presented in Figure 5, show that the only negative
and signi¯cant dummy is for distance 2 { that is, for authors who have one or several common
coauthors; other distance dummies are not signi¯cant.
The most likely explanation for this ¯nding is in terms of time and capacity constraints.26
Recall that, in our framework, proximity e®ects are identi¯ed by changes in the levels of prox-
imity. Prior to ¯rst collaboration, as two authors move closer to a distance of 2, there are two
e®ects at work: they are likely to get better information about each other; but also one of them
has started a new collaboration and has less time available for initiating a new collaboration.
The ¯rst e®ect has a positive in°uence on coauthorship, but the latter has a negative e®ect on
the probability of forming a new tie. For ¯rst-time collaborations, our results indicated that the
positive e®ect dominates. But once i and j have collaborated, there are no informational advan-
tages to be gained from proximity and so the negative e®ect prevails, dampening the probability
of repeat collaboration. This explanation is consistent with the absence of signi¯cant e®ects
at longer distances: as seen in Figure 5, a reduction in network distance from 4 to 3 does not
involve an additional link by either i or j and so there is no negative e®ect of fall in distance.
4.2 Interpretation of control variable coe±cients
The coe±cients of control variables are interesting in their own right. Consider the regression
results for ¯rst collaboration given in column (2) of Table 3. The coe±cients for average pro-
ductivity q
ij
t and average degree n
ij
t are signi¯cantly positive, suggesting that the likelihood
of collaboration increases when authors become more productive or gather more coauthors.




t are negative, indicating that the likelihood of ¯rst
collaboration falls when authors are more dissimilar in terms of productivity and number of
coauthors.
We also note that, in line with our discussion in section 3.1, the e®ect of ¯eld overlap on
¯rst coauthorship follows an inverted-U curve: the coe±cient of the ¯eld overlap index !
ij
t¡1
is signi¯cantly positive, whereas the coe±cient of the quadratic term (!
ij
t¡1)2 is signi¯cantly
negative. The likelihood of forming a collaboration is highest when the ¯eld overlap index is
.660, which is much higher than the average ¯eld overlap of .054 for random author pairs. Field
overlap is thus associated with a higher likelihood of initiating a collaboration.
26For a model of coauthor network formation in which capacity constraints play an important role, see Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).
234.3 Interpretation of the results in terms of acquaintance network
Figure 4 shows that network e®ects remain signi¯cant up to distance 9. At ¯rst glance this
appears too good to be true: the likelihood that two authors be introduced to each other by
a chain of 9 coauthors appears remote. Perhaps the best way to make sense of these ¯ndings
is in terms of the acquaintance network discussed in section 2.2. Information about coauthors
is conveyed via the coauthorship network. But information also °ows along other social links
that are not coauthor ties { and hence are not observed. At short distances, the distance in the
coauthor network dc is a good approximation of distance in the acquaintance network da. But
as dc increases, the likelihood rises that a shorter paths exists in the acquaintance network. This
implies that, as dc rises, it becomes a noisier measure of true social distance.
Secondly, E[dajdc] can remain relatively small even for large signi¯cant values of dc. In other
words, a signi¯cant coe±cient on the distance 9 dummy does not imply that an unbroken chain
of 9 coauthors was used to introduce two authors to each other. The distance between the two
authors in the acquaintance network was in all likelihood much shorter than 9. In fact, the
simulations in Section 2.2 suggest that the distance between two authors in the acquaintance
network is likely to be around 2 or 3. This second point is crucial because it explains why
distance dummy 9 can be signi¯cant without implying that unrealistically long chains of referral
are used to bring authors together.
To con¯rm this interpretation, we look for indirect evidence of the existence of an acquain-
tance network. In Section 2.2, we argued that one way to test for this is to introduce an
interaction term p £ logc, that is, proximity times the number of shortest paths. If there is no
acquaintance network, the number of shortest paths in the coauthorship network is measured
accurately even at large network distances. But if there is an acquaintance network, log c
ij
t¡1
becomes an increasingly inaccurate proxy for the number of shortest paths in the acquaintance
network. This leads us to estimate the following regression.
Pr(y
ij
t = 1) = ¸(® + ¯p
ij







If referral takes place through an acquaintance network, then °2 > 0. Results are shown in
column (2) of table 4. We see that the coe±cient °2 of the interaction term is positive and
signi¯cant. This evidence is consistent with the idea that coauthorship referrals circulate in an
unobserved acquaintance network that is denser than the observed coauthorship network.
244.4 Information and time
Our ¯ndings strongly suggest that social proximity promotes collaboration. The mechanism is
a combination of information revelation and referrals; authors that are socially closer are more
likely to obtain information about each other skills and practices as well as more likely to be
personally introduced to each other in social and professional gatherings. To strengthen our
claim that it is information revelation that drives the results, we examine whether the role of
network proximity has changed over time.
The period since the 1980's has witnessed the large scale adoption of new information tech-
nologies such as fax and electronic messaging, telephone charges have fallen, air travel has
become signi¯cantly cheaper, and the world wide web has developed. These developments facil-
itate the access of information concerning others and expand the pool of potential collaborators.
This suggests that the role of social networks in conveying information about others may be less
important now than before.
To gain some understanding of this important question, we re-estimate the ¯rst collaboration
regression separately for the periods before and after 1989. Estimation results, presented in Table
5, indeed show that the estimated coe±cient of network proximity is smaller for the 1990s than
for the 1980s, suggesting a somewhat reduced role for social proximity in recent times. The
coe±cient, however, remains signi¯cant, indicating that network proximity retains a role in the
formation of new coauthor relations even in the present internet age.
5 Robustness
To summarize, the results reported so far support the hypothesis that the likelihood of starting
a collaboration increases with network proximity, and that this is probably due to information
e®ects. We now present several robustness checks.
5.1 Shorter duration of network link
In our main regressions, network proximity between i and j in year t is measured as the inverse
distance between i and j in the network Gt. The network Gt contains a link whenever i and
j have coauthored an article published between year t ¡ 9 and t. This implicitly assumes that
a network link remains active for 10 years. To check that our results do not depend on this
assumption, we repeat the analysis using network measures in which Gt has a link if i and j
publish between t ¡ 4 and t, that is, a link persists for exactly 5 years.
Table 6 shows the results for the pairwise ¯xed e®ect regressions. It seems that the control
variables are able to capture more of the variation in this case, because the proximity e®ect
decreases by half in Table 6 when control variables are included. Nonetheless, we also observe
25that our main conclusion remains: network proximity remains signi¯cantly positive in the ¯rst
collaboration regression, whereas it remains signi¯cantly negative for subsequent collaborations.
Our results are therefore robust to the use of di®erent assumptions on the length of link activity.27
5.2 Variation in publication lags
Since our data come from a bibliographic database, we only observe a collaboration project at
the time of publication, that is, at its end. A single project typically takes several months if not
years to complete. On top of that, there are considerable delays between the moment a paper
is submitted to a journal and the moment it is published.28 There is therefore a considerable
di®erence between the time at which observe a collaboration and the time it actually started.
This may be cause for concern.
If project completion time and publication lags were the same for each paper, the dependent
variable and all regressors would be lagged by the same number of years. In that case, the
estimation results would not be a®ected. Unfortunately this is not the case: publication lags vary
over time and across publications, and this variation perturbs the order and timing of the events.
Although we regress the observations of the dependent variable, y
ij
t , on observations of lagged
explanatory variables, it is therefore conceivable that some observations of the dependent variable
correspond to decisions made after the decision corresponding to the explanatory variables.
To investigate whether this variation in publication lags a®ects our results, we repeat the
analysis lagging explanatory variables by 3 years instead of 1 year. This additional 2 years should
mitigate most of the problems of publication lags, since the variation in publication lags rarely
exceeds 3 years. By lagging explanatory variables by 3 years, however, we lose a considerable
amount of observations. Moreover, we expect the proximity e®ect to be less pronounced as time
passes. The results presented in Table 7, nevertheless show that there is little di®erence lagging
explanatory variables 1 year or 3 year. We therefore conclude that the variation of publication
lags probably does not distort the conclusions of our analysis.
5.3 Non-independence across observations
Our estimation approach implicitly assumes that, conditional on a pairwise ¯xed e®ects, con-
temporaneous observations are independent across pairs. Unfortunately, this assumption is
27It should in principle be possible to estimate the strength of the ties between all pairs of authors and to
measure network proximity in this weighted network, for instance to allow links to decay over time. Doing so
would require iterating between the estimation of the regressions and the construction of the network Gt and the
calculation of the proximity variables p
ij
t . Given how long it takes for the computer to calculate a single Gt and
p
ij
t , such an iterative procedure would represent a massive time investment which we feel is unjusti¯ed given the
relatively small potential payo®.
28Ellison (2002) reports a delay that has been increasing over time in top journals: on average well less than a
year in the 1970s, to more than a year and up to 2 years in the 1990s.
26unlikely to be entirely appropriate, given that an author who has several collaborators appears
in di®erent pairs in the dataset.
Although the pairwise ¯xed e®ect controls for individual characteristics that do not change
over time, we cannot reasonably treat the pairs in which the same author appears as contempo-
raneously independent. In particular, time constraints on researchers should imply a negative
contemporaneous correlation between pairs with the same author: if i decides to collaborate
with j, then i has less time to collaborate with k.
Contemporaneous correlation in residuals does not a®ect the consistency of the coe±cients,
but it can bias the standard errors. To the best of our knowledge, there is no known method
to correct for this bias within the framework of the ¯xed e®ects logit model. However, we
can investigate if this contemporaneous bias is problematic by doing the following exercise.
We repeat the regressions on a sub-sample of the data set in which it is assured that each
author appears in only one pair. That is, for every two observations y
ij
t and ykl
t we ensure that
fi;jg
T
fk;lg = ;. This eliminates the possibility that contemporaneous residuals are correlated
simply because they have an author in common. But it results in a massive reduction in the
number of usable observations since each author only appears once in the data. We therefore
expect a loss in signi¯cance as a mechanical consequence of the reduction in sample size.
To investigate the magnitude of this loss in signi¯cance, we draw from the full dataset
a random sample of pairs that has the same size as the sample without duplicate authors.
Estimates from this regression gives a sense of the magnitude of the reduction in signi¯cance
simply due to the reduction in sample size. Results, which are not presented here to save space,
show that, as anticipated, signi¯cance falls somewhat in both the random sample with duplicate
authors and the sample without duplicate authors. But our main results remain by and large
unchanged.
5.4 Detrending method
As we mentioned in Section 2 and discussed thoroughly in Appendix A, the estimation of the
¯rst collaboration regression with pairwise ¯xed e®ects requires us to detrend all explanatory
variables prior to estimating the ¯xed e®ect logit regression. In the results reported so far,
we do this by using linear detrending. We nevertheless worry that results would be a®ected
if explanatory variables followed a nonlinear trend. Simulations (not reported here) show that
this is indeed the case: parameters are signi¯cantly biased if the explanatory variables have
exponential or logarithmic trends but linear detrending is applied.
To investigate whether our results are robust to alternative assumptions regarding the form
of the trend, we repeat our analysis using alternative detrending methods, namely, exponential,
27logarithmic, and quadratic trends. We do this for the regression on ¯rst collaboration only since
results for subsequent collaboration are not a®ected by this problem.
Table 8 shows the results. We observe that the reported coe±cients for network proximity are
much larger than in Table 3 when we assume an exponential trend and somewhat smaller when
we assume a logarithmic or quadratic trend. Our conclusions on network proximity, however,
remain.
6 Conclusions
The matching of individuals in teams to create intellectual and physical output is a key element
of economic activity. Yet at any point in time there are many potential matches and the ability
and skills of these individuals is only imperfectly known. Therefore ¯nding a suitable match
takes time and e®ort and is subject to a great deal of uncertainty. It is plausible then to expect
that individuals will seek to economize on search costs by relying on social networks to access
easily available information on ability and match quality. The network of past team members is
particularly well suited for this purpose since past team work has revealed valuable information
about others. The aim of this paper was to examine the empirical relevance of this network
e®ect.
We studied the formation of coauthor relations among economists over a twenty year period
from 1980 to 1999. Our principal ¯nding is that a new collaboration is more likely among two
researchers if they are \closer" in the existing coauthor network. This proximity e®ect is positive
and robust and extends to network distances of up to 9 degrees of separation. At ¯rst glance
the network e®ect appears too large to be true { referral is unlikely to travel across 9 degrees
of separation. Our preferred interpretation is that distance in the co-authorship network is an
informative statistic about a possibly much shorter social distance in the denser but unobserved
acquaintance network.
Our empirical approach takes care of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among collab-
orating pairs as well as time varying observable heterogeneity. Moreover, we show that network
proximity does not have a positive e®ect on subsequent collaboration between authors. This
takes account of unobserved time-varying e®ects { such as non-measurable changes in research
interests. From this evidence we conclude that existing social networks have powerful e®ects on
the formation of new coauthor ties.
New research collaboration ties form in an environment where much public information is
available on individual ability { e.g., publications record, employment history. So we would
expect matching frictions to be less prevalent here than in other team formation processes.
Therefore empirical signi¯cance of networks in this context suggests that it would be natural to
expect social networks to signi¯cantly shape most matching processes at work in the economy.
28In particular, we hope that our ¯ndings will motivate further empirical study of the role of
social networks in the functioning of labor markets. One important avenue for future research is
to investigate the impact of collaboration and networks on the quality of research. The evidence
of network e®ects in the formation of collaborative teams is indicative of matching frictions, and
the presence of matching frictions makes us expect ine±ciency in team formation { the best
matches are not achieved { and inequity in access to good collaborators { researchers isolated
in a social network sense ¯nd it harder to identify suitable collaborators.
29Appendix A
In this appendix we illustrate the di±culty inherent in estimating a ¯xed e®ect logit model for
¯rst collaborations, and show how detrending can be used for inference purposes.
To illustrate how identi¯cation is achieved, consider the following example. Imagine we have
observations on collaborator pairs over two periods. Since we restrict our attention to ¯rst
collaborations, we have fy1;y2g = f0;1g. Let network distance d take only two values, say 2















If there are an equal number of observations of each type, there is no systematic relationship
between network distance d and the timing of ¯rst collaboration. In contrast, if most observations
fall in the second category, the initiation of a collaboration is more likely when coauthors are
closer. In this simple example, inference can be achieved by applying a simple t-test to d across
the two time periods { or alternatively by using regression analysis with y as dependent variable.
It is clear that this example can be generalized to more periods, more values of d, and more
regressors.
To analyze this problem, we construct a Monte Carlo simulation that reproduces the kind of
data we have. We begin by generating pair-wise ¯xed e®ects ui » N(0;2000).29 We then create
two potential regressors xit and zit indexed over individual (e.g., pair of authors) i and time t.
Each regressor is constructed as a trend with noise:
xit = t + "x
it
zit = t + "z
it
with "x
it » N(0;100) and "x
it » N(0;100). A latent variable y¤
it is then generated as:
y¤
it = ¡2 + xit + ui + "it (12)
with "it » N(0;400). The dichotomous dependent variable is de¯ned as ya
it = 1 if y¤
it > 0, 0
otherwise. Since zit does not enter equation (12), any correlation observed between zit and ya
it
must be regarded as spurious. We then de¯ne yit = ya
it except if ya
it¡s = 1 for any s > 0, in which
case yit is de¯ned as missing. Variable yit thus has the same form as the dependent variable in
the ¯rst collaboration case: a series of 0 ending with a single 1.
We generate 1000 samples of ya
it;yit;xit and zit, each with t = f1;:::20g and i = f1;:::100g.
We begin by regressing ya
it and yit on xit and zit using ¯xed e®ect logit. In the case of ya
it, the
29Variances are chosen so as to generate a distribution of the dependent variable that resembles that of the
paper.
30dependent variable switches back and forth from 0 to 1 with no clear trend. The ¯xed e®ect
logit regressor therefore yields consistent coe±cient estimates and correct inference. In the case
of yit, however, for each i, the sequence of dependent variables ends with a 1. This creates a
spurious correlation with any regressor that includes a trend component. As a result, variable
xit may erroneously test signi¯cant, leading to incorrect inference.
Results are shown in Table 9. The % signi¯cant column gives the percentage of Monte
Carlo replications in which the coe±cient is signi¯cantly di®erent from 0 at the 5% level. As
anticipated, the ¯xed e®ect logit applied to the full data ya
it yields a consistent 0 coe±cient for
zit. Moreover we see that the zit coe±cient is found signi¯cant only in 5% of the regressions, a
proportion commensurate with the 5% signi¯cance level used for the test. In contrast, results
for yit yield noticeably di®erent coe±cients for zit and xit. Since coe±cients estimates for ya
it are
consistent, this indicates that the coe±cients of both xit and zit are inconsistently estimated by
applying ¯xed e®ect logit to ¯rst collaboration-style data. Moreover, we see that in 28% of the
simulations we reject the (correct) null hypothesis that the coe±cient of zit is 0. In contrast, when
we perform this simulation without trend in xit and zit, results show no bias. The trend element
included in the regressors is what generates inconsistent estimates and incorrect inference.
This simple observation suggests that removing the trend in xit and zit should get rid of the
problem. To investigate whether this is indeed the case, we estimate the following regressions:
xit = °xt + vx
i + ex
it




it = xit ¡ b °xt and xd
it = xit ¡ b °zt. We then regress yit on xd
it and zd
it. If detrending
solves the spurious correlation problem, coe±cient estimates and inference should be similar to





Results are presented in Table 10. They show that in the Monte Carlo simulation detrending
eliminates the bias in both coe±cients in the yit { i.e., ¯rst collaboration { regression while
keeping things basically unchanged in the ya
it { i.e., repeated collaboration { regression. There
is a large loss of precision between the ya
it regression and the detrended yit regression. But this
is a mechanical consequence of the way we generated the data, which leads us to throw away all
observations of ya
it after the ¯rst 1 realization.
As a cure to our estimation problem, detrending is not without side-e®ects. This is because
detrending reduces the variation in x, and hence the amount of information that can be used
to identify its coe±cient. Table 10 illustrates what happens in the best of cases. Compare the
detrended and un-detrended regressions using repeated collaboration data. For these data, the
data generation process is such that the un-detrended regressions yield consistent estimates.
31We see that detrending leads to a loss of precision { the Monte Carlo sample variance of the x
coe±cient increases as a result of detrending.
Detrending can also introduce an attenuation bias which is somewhat analogous to what
happens in ¯xed e®ect linear regression models. If the data generation process is such that the
average duration to ¯rst collaboration is very short, or if most of the variation in x is persistent
over time, then much of the variation in xit is eliminated after detrending. As a result, the
coe±cient of x in (12) is biased towards 0. This is con¯rmed by Monte Carlo simulations.
However, the attenuation bias also means that we can nearly never reject the null hypothesis
that the coe±cient of x is zero. Inference has low power and is thus biased towards failing to
reject the null. What this means is that, if we can reject the null hypothesis after detrending, the
likelihood of a type I error is small { smaller on average than the reported p-value. This is also
con¯rmed by Monte Carlo simulations: depending on the data generation process, detrending
can entail a loss of power and may fail to reject the null hypothesis even when it is false. But it
nearly never result in a type I error, that is, rejecting the null when it should not be rejected.
In other words, hypothesis testing based on detrending is too conservative.
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34Figure 1: Relation between the distance in the coauthor network and the distance in the ac-
quaintance network.


















(a) Histogram of network distance in the simulated acquaintance network
















(b) Expected distance in acquaintance network given the distance in coauthor network























(c) Coefficient of number of shortest paths in a regression of c
a on c
c
Note: Acquaintance network is a simulated Erd} os-Renyi graph with 1000 nodes and 2500 links. The coauthor
network is simulated by taking a random subgraph with only 1000 links of the simulated acquaintance network.
35Figure 2: Histogram of distance in the network of the 1980s and the formation of links in 1990.

















(a) Histogram of network distance between all connected pairs of authors (1980−89)















(b) Histogram of network distance between authors that initiate a new collaboration in 1990



















(c) Probability of initiating a new link conditional on distance −− obtained as (b)/(a)
36Figure 3: Coe±cients of distance dummies in regressions on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent
collaboration, estimated with a logit estimator without controlling for pairwise ¯xed e®ects.























37Figure 4: Coe±cients of distance dummies ¯xed-e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration.






















38Figure 5: Coe±cients of distance dummies in ¯xed-e®ects logit regression on subsequent collab-
orations.






















39Table 1: Summary statistics of the data
Variable Random sample Before collaboration After collaboration
Number of pairs 162166 26922 14558
Number of observations 921392 160339 105854




Proximity .021 .086 .276
(.046) (.133) (.227)
Connected .189 .428 .686
Distance if connected 9.91 7.06 3.50
(2.84) (3.67) (2.82)
Number of shortest paths .545 .902 1.11
(1.81) (1.80) (1.44)
Avg. productivity 20.50 44.70 65.93
(33.75) (60.09) (87.23)
Dif. in productivity 32.06 50.92 57.78
(59.37) (80.65) (94.27)
Avg. number of coauthors 2.01 3.19 5.53
(1.88) (2.63) (3.61)
Dif. in number of coauthors 2.33 3.32 4.10
(2.77) (3.70) (4.37)
Field overlap .054 .305 .631
(.143) (.315) (.264)
Notes: for each variable and dataset the sample mean and (in parentheses) the standard deviation are shown.
Duration to ¯rst collab.: the duration to the ¯rst collaboration of a pair. Subsequent collaboration: number of
subsequent collaboration after the ¯rst collaboration. Connected: fraction of pairs that are directly or indirectly
connected to each other. Other variables are explained in the text.
40Table 2: Results of logit regression on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent collaboration without
controlling for pairwise ¯xed e®ects.
Regression First collaboration Subsequent collaboration
Pairs 195255 195525 40263 40263
Observations 1094861 1094861 242595 242595
Proximity 13.885** 10.387** .239** .227**
(.339) (.584) (.037) (.041)
Log Shortest Paths -.230** -.200** .234** .249**
(.020) (.022) (.020) (.020)
Avg. productivity .0121** .0020**
(.0009) (.0002)
Dif. in productivity -.0065** -.0016**
(.0005) (.0002)
Avg. number of coauthors -.072** -.031**
(.024) (.006)
Dif. in number of coauthors .089** .029**
(.011) (.003)
Field overlap 6.145** 1.636**
(.230) (.131)
Sq. Field overlap -2.856** -.701**
(.328) (.112)
Career time -.032** -.052** -.087** -.079**
(.004) (.004) (.002) (.002)
Intercept -12.751** -13.371** -1.591** -2.311**
(.018) (.023) (.016) (.039)
41Table 3: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent collabora-
tion.
Regression First collaboration Subsequent collaboration
Pairs 26922 26922 14558 14558
Observations 160339 160339 105854 105854
Proximity 1.970** 1.427** -1.452** -.588**
(.100) (.111) (.071) (.078)
Log Shortest Paths .067** .048** -.204** -.068**
(.018) (.018) (.024) (.024)
Avg. productivity .0013** -.0041**
(.0005) (.0004)
Dif. in productivity -.0007* .00174**
(.0003) (.0003)
Avg. number of coauthors .087** -.097**
(.011) (.008)
Dif. in number of coauthors -.012* .030**
(.006) (.005)
Field overlap .841** -1.718**
(.141) (.223)
Sq. Field overlap -.637** -.011
(.160) (.192)
42Table 4: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration: the e®ect of the interaction










Dif. in productivity -.0006
(.0003)
Avg. number of coauthors .082**
(.011)




Sq. Field overlap -.646**
(.160)
Proximity £ Log Shortest Paths 1.493** 1.022**
(.294) (.297)
43Table 5: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent collabora-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s.
Regression First collaboration Subsequent collaboration
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
Pairs 7732 17829 4776 10763
Observations 34651 81653 27661 58775
Proximity 1.014** .598** -1.149** -1.169**
(.226) (.144) (.166) (.114)
Log Shortest Paths .018 .014 -.189** -.070*
(.042) (.021) (.057) (.031)
Avg. productivity -.0032** -.0005 -.0074** -.0083**
(.0011) (.0009) (.0010) (.0007)
Dif. in productivity .0011 -.0011* .0014* .0030**
(.0007) (.0005) (.0007) (.0005)
Avg. number of coauthors .006 .010 -.107** -.160**
(.026) (.015) (.022) (.013)
Dif. in number of coauthors -.009 .010 .026* .048**
(.015) (.008) (.013) (.007)
Field overlap -.263 .142 -4.921** -3.970**
(.288) (.195) (.505) (.354)
Sq. Field overlap .306 -.035 1.339** -.955**
(.336) (.218) (.418) (.295)
44Table 6: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent collabora-
tion assuming that links are active for 5 years.
Regression First collaboration Subsequent collaboration
Pairs 25047 25047 14829 14829
Observations 144612 144612 103672 103672
Proximity 2.511** 1.189** -.736** -.264**
(.097) (.104) (.056) (.063)
Log Shortest Paths .092** -.005 -.164** -.062*
(.024) (.025) (.028) (.029)
Avg. productivity .0109** -.0043**
(.0007) (.0006)
Dif. in productivity -.0035** .0015**
(.0004) (.0004)
Avg. number of coauthors .260** -.079**
(.012) (.009)
Dif. in number of coauthors -.058** .023**
(.007) (.006)
Field overlap .951** -.019
(.124) (.158)
Sq. Field overlap -.640** -.748**
(.141) (.140)
45Table 7: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration and subsequent collabora-
tion, in which all explanatory variables are lagged 3 years relative to the dependent variable.
Regression First collaboration Subsequent collaboration
Pairs 17941 17941 8153 8153
Observations 100969 100969 57538 57538
Proximity 1.963** 1.420** -1.217** -.592**
(.133) (.147) (.096) (.104)
Log Shortest Paths .056* .037 -.195** -.079*
(.022) (.023) (.032) (.033)
Avg. productivity .0020** -.0046**
(.0007) (.0005)
Dif. in productivity -.0004 .0021**
(.0004) (.0004)
Avg. number of coauthors .071** -.096**
(.014) (.011)
Dif. in number of coauthors -.008 .016*
(.008) (.007)
Field overlap 1.306** -.706*
(.176) (.313)
Sq. Field overlap -1.091** -.070
(.201) (.265)
46Table 8: Results of ¯xed e®ects logit regression on ¯rst collaboration with di®erent detrending
methods.
Regression Exponential trend Logarithmic trend Quadratic trend
Pairs 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922 26922
Observations 160339 160339 160339 160339 160339 160339
Proximity 12.747** 3.736** 1.382** 1.049** 1.344** 1.165**
(.194) (.193) (.098) (.109) (.099) (.110)
Log Shortest Paths .379** .174** -.012** .002 .025 .020
(.018) (.021) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)
Avg. productivity .0250** -.0037** -.0029**
(.0011) (.0005) (.0005)
Dif. in productivity -.0101** .0004 .0002
(.0006) (.0003) (.0003)
Avg. number of coauthors 1.469** .103** .064**
(.020) (.010) (.011)
Dif. in number of coauthors -.162** -.010 -.005
(.010) (.006) (.006)
Field overlap 4.687** -.114 .206
(.217) (.140) (.140)
Sq. Field overlap -2.838** -.175 -.132
(.233) (.159) (.159)
47Table 9: Monte Carlo results without detrending.
E[coef] ¾[coef] % signi¯cant
A. ya
it is the dependent variable
coe±cient of xit 0.088 0.008 100%
coe±cient of zit 0.000 0.007 5%
Number of observations 2000
B. yit is the dependent variable
coe±cient of xit 0.131 0.032 100%
coe±cient of zit 0.032 0.024 28%
Average number of usable observations 237
Notes: E[coef] is the mean coe±cient value in the sample of 1000 simulations. ¾[coef] is the standard deviation
of the coe±cient values. % signi¯cant is the fraction of coe±cients in the sample of 1000 simulations that have
an absolute t-value larger than 2.
Table 10: Monte Carlo results with detrending.
E[coef] ¾[coef] % signi¯cant
A. ya
it is the dependent variable
coe±cient of xd
it 0.085 0.009 100%
coe±cient of zd
it 0.000 0.008 5%
Number of observations 2000
B. yit is the dependent variable
coe±cient of xd
it 0.089 0.025 98%
coe±cient of zd
it 0.000 0.021 4%
Average number of usable observations 237
Notes: E[coef] is the mean coe±cient value in the sample of 1000 simulations. ¾[coef] is the standard deviation
of the coe±cient values. % signi¯cant is the fraction of coe±cients in the sample of 1000 simulations that have
an absolute t-value larger than 2.
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